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ABSTRACT
In this study, the link between atheistic beliefs and two child-rearing values
(obedience and autonomy) is explored. Atheists would be more likely to show
preferences for autonomy and less likely for obedience. Two individual-level
explanations, namely educational attainment and expressive individualism, are
tested. Moreover, the contextual effects of both religious climate and
collectivistic-individualistic culture in a country are investigated. Using data
from 30 countries from the European Values Study [(2011) 4th wave,
Integrated Dataset ZA4800. Data File Version 3.0.0. (November 2011). Cologne:
GESIS Data Archive. doi:10.4232/1.11004], it was found that both educational
attainment and expressive individualism are explanations of why individuals
with atheistic beliefs prefer autonomy more compared to other individuals.
However, for obedience, expressive individualism could only explain the
difference in preferences between religious individuals and atheists, but not
the difference between atheists and those who are unsure about their
religious belief. In addition, contrary to our expectations, no moderating effect
of the religious context and collectivistic-individualistic culture on the
relationship between atheistic beliefs and child-rearing values was found.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 21 November 2017; Accepted 22 June 2018
KEYWORDS Atheism; autonomy; obedience; religion; collectivism; cross-national research
Introduction
There has been a long research interest in the relationship between reli-
gion and child-rearing values (Lenski 1961; Alwin 1986; Ellison and
Sherkat 1993; Starks and Robinson 2005). Child-rearing values are
usually defined as ‘characteristics that adults find most important or desir-
able in children’ (Ellison and Sherkat 1993, 313). In the literature, two
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child-rearing values are most often discussed: obedience and autonomy
(Alwin 2001). Obedience refers to ‘conformity to external rules and
obeying adult authority’, whereas autonomy is ‘the ability to think for
themselves and reason independently’ (Halman and Sieben 2014: 122).
Early studies concerning the ‘Religious Factor’ in child-rearing values
mainly focussed on differences between religious denominations (Lenski
1961). For example, Protestants were less likely to prefer obedience and
more likely to value autonomy compared to Catholics (Lenski 1961).
Later, differences in child-rearing preferences were found to be larger
within religious denominations than between them (Alwin 1984), and the
scientific attention shifted to religious behaviour, i.e. church attendance
(Alwin 1986) and religious beliefs (Ellison and Sherkat 1993). Halman
and Sieben (2014) observed that differences between Dutch denominations
in both autonomy and obedience could be attributed to differences in church
attendance, whereas differences in preferences for autonomy were explained
by transcendental beliefs: those who believe in a personal God were less
likely to pick autonomy as an important child-rearing value. In a later
study using 42 European countries, Sieben and Halman (2017) confirmed
the relationship between church attendance and preferences for obedience.
Interestingly, the authors also found that the religious context mainly
affected those who did not attend religious services. In more religious
countries, these individuals are more likely to show preferences for obedi-
ence compared to their counterparts in more secularised countries.
This result is puzzling and calls for more research into the child-rearing
preferences of the non-religious. So far no attempt has been made to
explain why non-religious individuals prefer autonomy more and obedi-
ence less. Often-times, the non-religious are only taken into account as
a reference category and it is assumed that their child-rearing preferences
can be explained by their lack of religious beliefs. No elaborate theoretical
framework on the link between non-religiosity and preferences for certain
child-rearing values has been established. This study wants to contribute
to the research field by looking into the child-rearing preferences of athe-
ists, defined as ‘individuals who do not believe in God and/or find the
concept of God meaningless or incoherent’ (Zuckerman 2009: 950). The
number of individuals who do not believe in God is estimated to lie
between 500 and 750 million around the world: the highest number is
found in Europe (Zuckerman 2009).
It is important to investigate the preferences of individuals with athe-
istic beliefs next to religious individuals, because their preferences might
be influenced by different factors compared to religious individuals
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(Sieben and Halman 2017). In this study, we focus on two individual
factors to explain the child-rearing preferences of atheists: educational
attainment and moral individualism. In addition, Alwin (2001) argues
that child-rearing values can provide insights into future social change,
in particular changes in family life. After all, child-rearing values represent
the type of children parents want to raise, and this might be influenced by
personal religious beliefs, such as atheism.
Most of the studies mentioned so far focused on the United States,
where religion plays a larger role in daily life (Sieben and Halman
2017). In Europe, the religious climate is different, with the secularised
sphere in the western part, but also very religious countries such as
Ireland and Poland (Casanova 2009). The number of individuals with
atheistic beliefs highly varies between European countries: about 20% in
the Czech Republic, Russia and France, compared to 1–3% in Poland
and Portugal (Casanova 2009). Given the differences in religious contexts,
Europe is a suitable place for studying the link between non-religiosity and
child-rearing values, since it allows us to investigate to what extent the reli-
gious context in a country is of influence on the relationship between indi-
viduals’ atheistic beliefs and their child-rearing values.
In addition, the cultural context will also influence the child-rearing
preferences of atheists. In collectivistic cultures, parents would put more
focus on ‘interdependence and conformity to group rules, whereas in indi-
vidualistic cultures, autonomy and self-reliance are more important’
(Suizzo 2007: 507). We will therefore take the level of collectivism-indivi-
dualism in a country into account as well, and employ data of the Euro-
pean Values Study (EVS 2011) to investigate the child-rearing
preferences of individuals in 30 different countries.
Theory and hypotheses
In general, the absence of traditional religious beliefs is believed to be the
reason for atheists to be less in favour of obedience and more of autonomy.
This line of reasoning is rather indirect, as it is derived from the way in
which religious beliefs are thought to work for religious individuals. One
of the aspects mentioned in this discussion is biblical literalism (Ellison
and Sherkat 1993), which refers to the conservative belief that the Bible rep-
resents the word of God and therefore is flawless. Given that the Bible con-
tains passages that highlight children honouring their parents and obeying
(parental) authority, those who are religious will prefer obedience in chil-
dren. Moreover, children who are taught to be obedient would be less
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likely to disagree with the values they are brought up with, including their
religious faith (Ellison and Sherkat 1993). Since individuals with atheistic
beliefs do not share these traditional religious views, they will be less
likely to show preferences for obedience and more likely to prefer auton-
omy. Evidence to support this reasoning is provided by Manning (2015)
who showed that many parents who are not religiously affiliated want to
inform their child about religion and spirituality, but leave the decision
about religious truth to the child itself. This focus on independent
decision-making would lead to a preference for autonomy. This leads to
the first hypothesis: individuals with atheistic beliefs are more likely to
prefer autonomy and less likely to prefer obedience (H1).
Atheistic beliefs and child-rearing preferences: individual
explanations
However, several alternative explanations could be given for the child-
rearing preferences of individuals with atheistic beliefs. In this study, we
focus on educational attainment and expressive individualism. To start
with educational attainment, many studies show that the higher educated
prefer autonomy more and obedience less than their lower educated
counterparts because of several reasons (Alwin 1984; Van der Slik et al.
2002). First, through education individuals are able to develop ‘a more
secure personality which enhances the ability to develop autonomous
and probably less conventional values and behaviours’ (Van der Slik
et al. 2002: 490). Education expands the frame of reference and increases
the awareness that there are several alternative ways of life, which would
lead to tolerance towards different beliefs (Phelan et al. 1995). Higher edu-
cated parents might want to teach children about these alternative ways of
life, which is why the autonomy to choose between those alternative ways
of life would be more important for the higher educated. Second, school-
ing directly transfers progressive or tolerant values to students (Kalmijn
and Kraaykamp 2007). Since autonomy is a more liberal child-rearing
value, the higher educated will be more likely to prefer it. Third, cognitive
abilities could play a role. Individuals with more cognitive abilities will be
more likely to handle complicated matters, are more open to experience,
and develop a more objective view, given that theymore are able to consider
a range of distinct views (Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2007). On the other
hand, individuals that reason at a lower level are generally more likely to
use their own practical knowledge or traditional norms as a source for par-
enting values (Dékovic and Gerris 1992). Finally, educational attainment
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and work complexity are related. Kohn (1969) showed that those who have
more autonomy in their work have a preference for autonomy. Since higher
educated usually have more self-direction at work, the link between edu-
cation and child-rearing preferences can be explained.
Several studies show that individuals with atheistic beliefs are higher
educated compared to religious individuals (Sherkat 2008; Zuckerman
2009). In addition, atheists are overrepresented in academia (Cald-
well-Harris 2012). Taken all of this together, the second hypothesis is:
the relationship between atheistic beliefs and preferences for autonomy
and obedience can be explained by atheists having a higher educational
level (H2).
The second individual-level mechanism to explain child-rearing prefer-
ences of atheists focuses on moral views. In this context, Davis and Robin-
son (2001) distinguish between modernists (which they argue can both be
religious believers and secularists) and religiously orthodox. The reli-
giously orthodox believe there is a divine source that determines
whether actions are good or evil and that the moral rules provided in reli-
gious texts apply in every situation. On the other hand, modernists believe
that ‘individuals themselves are the ultimate judges of what is morally
right and wrong and that they are responsible for determining the
course of their lives’ (Davis and Robinson 2001: 24). Because atheists
usually have more modernistic views, they will be more likely to teach
children to think independently in order to decide for themselves what
is right and wrong. This is confirmed by the finding that compared to reli-
gious people, atheists are less dogmatic and more open-minded and non-
conformist (Zuckerman 2009; Caldwell-Harris 2012). These ideas are all
linked to expressive individualism, which is a form of individualism
associated with moral independence and innovativeness (Halman 1996).
Since individuals with atheistic beliefs are expected to have a higher
level of expressive individualism, they will value autonomy more,
whereas religious individuals, who have a low level of expressive individu-
alism will value obedience more. From this, the third hypothesis is
derived: the relationship between atheistic beliefs and preferences for auton-
omy and obedience can be explained by the expressive individualistic moral
standards of atheists (H3).
Atheistic beliefs and child-rearing values: moderating contexts
As mentioned in the introduction, contexts shape the child-rearing values
of individuals with atheistic beliefs too. For example, Tamis-LeMonda
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et al. (2008) mention that the orientations of parents reflect the current
values and norms of the cultures they are a part of. Since different
countries have different cultures, parents in different countries will have
different opinions on child-rearing. Two moderating contextual influences
will be discussed: the religious context (i.e. secularisation) and collectivis-
tic versus individualistic cultures.
A key characteristic of secularisation is that religion loses its impor-
tance in society and in individuals’ daily lives. Religion thus becomes
less important for prescribing (child-rearing) values in secular countries.
Several mechanisms account for this. First, in countries where religion
is less prominent, less traditional religious messages will be displayed
through institutions such as media outlets, educational system, or politics
(Sieben and Halman 2017). Second, religious beliefs are less and less
‘ratified by the social environment’ (Storm 2016: 116) in these countries.
Norms associated with religion need to be approved of by others in their
network (e.g. family, friends) to be effective. If the amount of religious
individuals is small in a country, interaction with likeminded religious
individuals is limited (Moore and Vanneman 2003). On the other hand,
atheists who live in religious countries might find that their preferences
for autonomy are not approved of by the people in their network, or by
the social and political institutions, which is why they might be influenced
to be more in favour of obedience.
As mentioned before, a similar effect was found by Sieben and Halman
(2017), who show that individuals who do not attend religious services
and live in a religious country prefer obedience more and autonomy
less compared to their counterparts in more secularised countries. This
effect could exist as well for individuals with atheistic beliefs who live in
more religious countries compared to those in more secular countries.
Through social interaction with religious individuals and information
channels such as media or work, atheists could be influenced to show
more preference for obedience (and less for autonomy). At the same
time, given that religion has less influence in prescribing values and
norms in secularised countries, child-rearing values in these countries
will be less influenced by religion. A larger role will be played by other
factors such as educational level. This implies that having atheistic
beliefs will have less influence on the preference for certain child-
rearing values in these countries. This concludes the fourth hypothesis:
the relationship between atheistic beliefs and preferences for autonomy
and obedience will be weaker in countries with a higher level of secularisa-
tion (H4).
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Next to the religious context, a country’s collectivistic versus individua-
listic culture may play a moderating role in the relationship between athe-
istic beliefs and child-rearing values. The main difference between
collectivistic and individualistic cultures, as presented by de Mooij and
Hofstede (2010) is that in individualistic cultures people are ‘I’-conscious,
which means that one’s identity is dependent on the person itself, whereas
in collectivistic cultures, people are ‘we’-conscious meaning that one’s
identity is derived from the place occupied in the social system. Because
of this, different ideals for children are issued between the two cultures.
The individualistic model reflects a preference for ‘independence and
self-reliance, whereas the collectivistic model revolves around values of
interdependence, conformity to group norms and relatedness’ (Suizzo
2007: 507). Parents from an individualistic culture are described as
encouraging children to make independent decisions and have weaker
ties to the group, while parents from collectivistic cultures would focus
more on promoting interdependence and development of strong group
ties (Tamis-LeMonda et al. 2008). Since obedience is important to
achieve harmony in the group, they would value this more.
On the other hand, autonomy would be valued less given that making
independent decisions does not match with the focus on group harmony
which is present in collectivistic cultures. Moreover, the same argument of
ratification by the social environment made for religion could apply to col-
lectivistic-individualistic cultures as well. In order to be effective, norms
associated with collectivistic culture need to be approved of by the
social environment and/or by social and political institutions. Atheists
who live in collectivistic countries might find that their more liberal
child-rearing attitudes are influenced by the collectivistic views of other
individuals in their network. Thus, although atheists are more likely to
show preferences for autonomy and less for obedience because of their
higher educational level and expressive individualism, they might prefer
obedience more if they live in a country with a more collectivistic
culture. This would weaken the link between atheistic beliefs and child-
rearing values: the relationship between atheistic beliefs and preferences
for autonomy and obedience will be weaker in countries with a collectivistic
culture (H5).
Data and methods
We test our hypotheses on data from the fourth wave of the EVS (2011),
which includes information on religious, family and political views of
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respondents of 18 years and older from 47 European countries. The data is
collected using stratified multi-stage random sampling and standardised
questionnaires employed in face-to-face interviews. Strict methodological
guidelines are applied to ensure cross-country-comparability. We exclude
data from twelve countries, because there is no information available on
collectivistic-individualistic culture. Moreover, data from Turkey,
Romania and Ireland are excluded given a high number of missing
values on both child-rearing values. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics;
Table 2 presents macro descriptive statistics per country.
Child-rearing values
Respondents were asked to choose a maximum of five qualities they con-
sidered to be especially important from a list of eleven qualities which chil-
dren can be encouraged to learn at home. These qualities were: (a) good
manners, (b) independence, (c) hard work, (d) feeling of responsibility,
(e) imagination, (f) tolerance and respect for other people, (g) thrift,
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation
Individual level variables (N = 37,645)
Child-rearing values
Autonomy 0 1 0.487
Obedience 0 1 0.246
Atheistic beliefs
Personal God 0 1 0.364
Unsure about belief 0 1 0.501
No God, spirit or life force 0 1 0.135
Educational level
Pre-primary/none 0 1 0.024
Primary 0 1 0.093
Lower secondary 0 1 0.190
Upper secondary 0 1 0.409
Post-secondary 0 1 0.039
First stage tertiary 0 1 0.237
Second stage tertiary 0 1 0.008
Expressive individualism
Clear guidelines about good/evil 0 1 0.249
Justified by special circumstances 0 1 0.351
Depends entirely on circumstances 0 1 0.400
Control variables
Age 18 108 47.940 17.801
Gender 0 1 0.559
Having a partner 0 1 0.550
Having children 0 1 0.719
Country level variables (N = 30)
Average church attendance 2.250 5.690 3.206 0.827
Collectivism–individualism index 20 89 56.322 18.759
GDP per capita (US$1000) 3.890 112.850 35.488 25.871
Source: EVS (2011).
EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 11
saving money and things, (h) determination, perseverance, (i) religious
faith, (j) unselfishness and (k) obedience. We focus on independence
and obedience. According to Alwin (1989: 202), independence can be
viewed as ‘the crucial quality associated with autonomy’, which is why
it was chosen to represent autonomy.1 It should be noted that respondents
who picked more than five qualities are left out of the analysis. Two
separate models will be employed for the preference of obedience and
autonomy given that Alwin (2001) mentions that these two concepts
should be viewed separately, to the extent that they are developed






















Albania 1238 33.4 26.5 2.856 20 4.370
Austria 1359 64.7 13.6 3.270 55 51.386
Belgium 1483 33.0 36.5 2.496 75 48.420
Bulgaria 969 35.6 13.6 3.321 55 7.296
Croatia 1120 35.2 35.3 3.920 33 15.893
Czech
Republic
1293 61.6 19.0 2.265 58 22.649
Denmark 1423 80.0 13.6 2.790 74 64.182
Estonia 1405 24.3 27.0 2.527 60 18.094
Finland 1000 49.2 19.6 2.517 63 53.401
France 1457 26.9 27.0 2.249 71 45.413
Germany 1845 72.1 9.4 2.500 67 45.699
Great Britain 1230 46.7 37.0 2.483 89 45.195
Greece 1449 41.5 24.6 4.374 35 31.686
Hungary 1062 71.0 28.5 2.613 80 15.649
Italy 1141 35.5 24.5 4.297 76 40.640
Latvia 1096 64.3 17.7 3.014 70 16.323
Lithuania 1227 74.5 20.2 3.743 60 14.961
Luxembourg 1287 46.9 21.8 2.794 60 112.851
Malta 1248 33.9 29.2 5.695 59 20.900
Netherlands 1466 47.1 29.2 2.918 80 56.928
Norway 1073 86.3 19.4 2.597 69 96.880
Poland 1094 34.1 28.9 5.089 60 13.906
Portugal 1340 38.5 28.1 3.981 27 24.815
Russian
Federation
1164 33.0 27.9 2.903 39 11.635
Serbia 1319 36.5 35.3 3.316 25 6.701
Slovak
Republic
1031 64.8 22.4 4.039 52 18.604
Slovenia 1102 72.2 21.5 3.223 27 27.501
Spain 1343 38.3 29.5 2.818 51 35.578
Switzerland 1132 64.2 14.2 2.724 68 72.119
Ukraine 1249 21.8 39.3 2.483 25 3.890
Source: EVS (2011), Hofstede et al. (2010), World Bank (2008).
1Although the two concepts overlap, Chirkov et al. (2003) found that autonomy and independence can be
differentiated. Results might therefore be sensitive to the specific concept used.
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independently of each other. Indeed, respondents could pick both child-
rearing values (6.6% in the current sample).
Finally, although some studies on child-rearing values focus on samples
of parents, the current study focuses on the general public. Acevedo et al.
(2015) mention that the use of broader samples is informative given that
these samples give a good outlook on the climate in which parents are
located and which type of parenting feedback they receive.
Atheistic beliefs
Respondents were asked to indicate which of the following statements was
closest to their personal beliefs: ‘there is a personal God’, ‘there is some
spirit or life force’, ‘I don’t really know what to think’ and ‘I don’t really
think there is any sort of spirit, God or life force’. Following the reasoning
by Halman and Sieben (2014), respondents are classified as being atheistic
if they agree with the last statement. Those who mention they believe in a
personal God are classified as being religious since this statement comes
closest to the traditional theistic belief (Halman and Sieben 2014).
Because no explicit hypotheses are formulated about transcendentalists
(those who believe in the supernatural) and agnostics (those who do
not know what to think), they are recoded into one category of individuals
that are unsure about their religious beliefs.2 Dummy variables are created
in order to compare these three categories on child-rearing preferences
using atheistic beliefs as the reference category.
Individual characteristics
Educational attainment is measured by asking respondents about their
highest level of education completed. Answer categories are made interna-
tionally comparable by using the ISCED classification, ranging from ‘pre-
primary education or no education’, ‘primary/first stage basic education’,
‘lower secondary/second stage basic education’, ‘post-secondary non-
tertiary education’, ‘first stage tertiary education’ to ‘second stage of
tertiary education’. Dummies are used for every category of educational
level: the highest educational level is the reference category.
The second individual characteristic concerns expressive individualism.
This is measured by the following question: ‘Here are three statements
2For random slope multilevel models, problems with convergence can arise if some categories have a low
number of observations (West et al. 2007). The random slope models with four dummies did not con-
verge because of this, which forms an additional reason to recode the two categories into one.
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which people sometimes make when discussing good and evil. Which one
comes closest to your own point of view?
A. There are absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and what is
evil. These always apply to everyone, whatever the circumstances.
B. There are absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and what is
evil. However, deviating from these guidelines is sometimes justified
by special circumstances.
C. There can never be absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and
what is evil. What is good and what is evil depends entirely on the
circumstances at the time.’
Following Halman (1996), the first statement represents a low score on
expressive individualism, whereas the third statement indicates a high
score on expressive individualism. The second statement represents a
more neutral option. Three dummy variables are created; the third state-
ment is taken as the reference category.
Contextual characteristics
Two country-level variables are distinguished: the level of secularisation
and the level of collectivism-individualism. Following Ruiter and de
Graaf (2006), the level of secularisation is measured by the average attend-
ance of religious services in a country. Respondents in EVS (2011) were
asked to indicate how often they attend religious services: ‘more than
once a week’, ‘once a week’, ‘once a month’, ‘only on specific holy days’,
‘once a year’, ‘less often’ and ‘never, practically never’. Based on their
answers, average attendance per country is calculated. Countries with a
lower average attendance rate are more secular than countries with a
higher average attendance rate. In addition we employ one of the most
well-known cross-national measures of collectivistic-individualistic
culture, developed by Hofstede et al. (2010). This country index ranges
from 0 (very collectivistic) to 100 (very individualistic).
Control variables
The analyses are statistically controlled for variables that are associated
with both atheistic beliefs and child-rearing preferences. The first
control variable is age given that there is much evidence that atheists
are younger compared to religious individuals (Zuckerman 2009).
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Moreover, gender will be taken into account since men are more likely to
be atheistic than women (Baker and Smith 2009). In addition, older indi-
viduals and men are more likely to show preferences for obedience and
less for autonomy (Ellison and Sherkat 1993). Finally, it is taken into
account whether the respondent has a partner and/or one or more
children.
In addition, an important country-level characteristic that is controlled
for is economic prosperity, measured by GDP per capita (in 1000 USD).
Zuckerman (2009) shows that the number of atheists is lower in countries
with lower prosperity. Moreover, Hofstede et al. (2010) mention that in
general, more wealthy countries are more individualistic, whereas
poorer countries are more collectivistic. The data on economic prosperity
was retrieved from the World Bank (2008).
Analytical strategy
Linear probability multilevel (LPM) models will be employed. Multilevel
models account for clustering in the data (individuals are nested in
countries). In addition, LPM treats our dichotomous dependent variable
as continuous. In contrast to logistic regression models, coefficients
between different LPM models can be compared and interpreted as prob-
abilities. A drawback is that LPM might generate inefficient models and
unrealistic probabilities (higher than one or lower than zero). However,
these disadvantages are outweighed by the benefits, making LPM a suit-
able option when the dependent variable is dichotomous (Mood 2010).
The models are build up stepwise. Model 1 includes atheistic beliefs, the
country-level characteristics and the control variables as fixed effects. In
Model 2, the dummies for educational attainment and expressive indivi-
dualism are added. In Model 3, random slopes for the two dummies of
atheistic beliefs will be added to verify whether there is between-country
variation in the relationship between atheistic beliefs and child-rearing
values. Finally, Model 4 contains both cross-level interactions to test the
moderating effect of religious context and collectivistic-individualistic
cultures.
Results
Figure 1 shows that individuals who believe in a personal God are more
likely (28.6%) to choose obedience as an important value for children
compared to individuals who are unsure about their beliefs (23%) and
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atheists (20.3%). With respect to autonomy, 39.6% of the religious individ-
uals prefer this value compared to 59.6% of those with atheistic beliefs. In
addition, 52.4% of the individuals who are unsure mention autonomy as
being important. Overall, obedience is preferred less than autonomy
(24.6% versus 48.7%). Moreover, there is a lot of variation in child-
rearing preferences across countries. As presented in Table 2, the prefer-
ence for obedience seems to be the highest in Ukraine (39.3%) and the
lowest in Germany (9.4%), whereas the preference for autonomy is
highest in Norway (86.3%) compared to Ukraine (21.8%).
Multilevel analyses for obedience
The results of the LPM model will be discussed first for obedience
(Table 3). From the empty model (not shown in table), the intraclass cor-
relation coefficient (ICC = 0.031) was calculated,3 indicating that only
3.1% of the differences in preferences for obedience can be attributed to
country differences. From the first model, it can be concluded that those
who believe in a personal God (b = 0.058, p < .01) and those who are
unsure about their belief (b = 0.016, p < .05) are more likely to prefer obe-
dience compared to atheists.
In Model 2 both explanatory variables (educational attainment and
expressive individualism) are added. The coefficients for educational
Figure 1. Preferences for obedience and autonomy by atheistic beliefs (in %). Source:
EVS (2011).
3The ICC is calculated by dividing country-level variance by the total of individual variance and country-
level variance: 0.0057/(0.1797 + 0.0057) = 0.031.
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attainment show that higher educated individuals are less likely to prefer
obedience. Furthermore, those who are low in expressive individualism,
i.e. those who think there are clear guidelines about good and evil, are
more in favour of obedience compared to those who are high in expressive
individualism, i.e. those who think what is good and evil depends on the
circumstances (b = 0.020, p < .01). On the other hand, no difference in
obedience was found between those from the middle category and those
who are high in expressive individualism (b = 0.002, p = .684). Compared
to Model 1, the coefficient of preferring obedience for individuals who
believe in a personal God compared to atheists decreased by 21.3%
(from b = 0.061 to b = 0.048), whereas, for those who are unsure about
their belief a decrease of 6.3% (from 0.016 to 0.015) is noticed.
Table 3. LPM models on preferences for obedience (N = 37,645 in 30 countries).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E.
Individual level variables
Constant 0.249 0.079 0.175 0.081 0.180 0.079
Atheistic beliefs
Personal God 0.061** 0.008 0.048** 0.008 0.046** 0.010
Unsure about belief 0.016* 0.007 0.015* 0.007 0.014 0.007
Educational level
Pre-primary/none 0.241** 0.028 0.242** 0.028
Primary 0.209** 0.025 0.210** 0.025
Lower secondary 0.180** 0.024 0.181** 0.024
Upper secondary 0.116** 0.024 0.117** 0.024
Post-secondary non-tertiary 0.109** 0.026 0.110** 0.026
First stage tertiary 0.042 0.023 0.042 0.024
Moral individualism
Clear guidelines 0.020** 0.006 0.021** 0.006
Special circumstances 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.005
Control variables
Age 0.001** 0.001 0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000
Gender −0.022** 0.005 −0.022** 0.004 −0.022** 0.004
Partner −0.012** 0.005 −0.002 0.005 −0.002 0.005
Child −0.004 0.006 −0.010 0.006 −0.010 0.006
Country level variables
Average service attendance −0.002 0.017 −0.009 0.017 −0.006 0.016
Collectivism–individualism index −0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 −0.000 0.001
GDP (US$1000) −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001
Random effects
Individual variance 0.179** 0.001 0.176** 0.001 0.176** 0.001
Country level variance
Intercept variance 0.005** 0.001 0.005** 0.001 0.004** 0.002
Variance random slope (Personal God) 0.001 0.001
Covariance 0.000 0.001
Intercept variance −0.001 0.001






However, the differences in preferences for obedience between the three
groups remain significant (b = 0.048, p < .01 and b = 0.015, p < .05
respectively).
Additional analyses in which educational attainment and expressive
individualism are added separately show that educational level indeed
partly mediates the relationship between atheistic beliefs and preference
for obedience, which is in line with H2. In addition, there seems to be
no difference in the coefficients between those who are unsure between
Model 1 and the additional model with expressive individualism only
(b = 0.016 in both models). Thus, for those who are unsure about their
belief, differences in expressive individualism do not explain differences
in their preferences for autonomy. Only for those who believe in a per-
sonal God, expressive individualism partly mediates the link between
their religious beliefs and preferences for obedience, partly confirming H3.
In Model 3, the random slopes for atheistic beliefs are added. The
results show that the relationship between atheistic beliefs (versus either
religious beliefs or being unsure about your belief) and preferences
for obedience does not significantly vary between countries (s2 = 0.001,
p = .154 and s2 = 0.001, p = .123). Given these outcomes, it is not informa-
tive to test the cross-level interactions: the relationship between atheistic
beliefs and obedience is the same in all countries.
Multilevel analyses for autonomy
Next, the results for autonomy will be discussed. The intraclass correlation
coefficient (ICC = 0.133)4 indicates that 13.3% of the differences in prefer-
ences for autonomy can be attributed to country differences. This ICC is
higher compared to obedience, probably because the country variation in
autonomy is higher compared to obedience (see Table 2). Model 1 in
Table 4 shows that both religious individuals (b =−0.128, p < .01) and
those who are unsure about their religious beliefs (b =−0.048, p < .01)
are less likely to prefer autonomy compared to atheists, conforming H1.
In Model 2, both educational level and expressive individualism are
added. Individuals with a higher educational level are more likely to
show preferences for autonomy. The largest difference was found
between individuals that attended second stage tertiary education com-
pared to those who only attended pre-primary or no education (b =
−0.232, p < .01). Furthermore, individuals who are high in expressive indi-
vidualism, i.e. those who believe that there are clear guidelines about good
40.033/(0.033 + 0.217) = 0.133.
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Table 4. LPM models on preferences for autonomy (N = 37,645 in 30 countries).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E.
Individual level variables
Constant 0.535 0.177 0.627 0.175 0.635 0.175 0.601 0.184
Atheistic beliefs
Personal God −0.128** 0.008 −0.113** 0.008 −0.114** 0.013 −0.060 0.091
Unsure about belief −0.048** 0.007 −0.047** 0.007 −0.048** 0.010 −0.029 0.076
Educational attainment
Pre-primary/none −0.232** 0.031 −0.229** 0.031 −0.230** 0.030
Primary −0.201** 0.027 −0.200** 0.027 −0.201** 0.027
Lower secondary −0.144** 0.027 −0.146** 0.027 −0.146** 0.027
Upper secondary −0.109** 0.026 −0.110** 0.026 −0.110** 0.026
Post-secondary non
tertiary
−0.095** 0.029 −0.098** 0.029 −0.098** 0.029
First stage tertiary −0.065* 0.027 −0.065* 0.026 −0.066* 0.026
Moral individualism
Clear guidelines −0.059** 0.006 −0.060** 0.006 −0.058** 0.006
Special circumstances −0.030** 0.006 −0.026** 0.006 −0.030** 0.006
Control variables
Age −0.003** 0.000 −0.002** 0.000 −0.002** 0.000 −0.002** 0.000
Gender 0.023** 0.005 0.023** 0.005 0.023** 0.005 0.023** 0.005
Partner −0.003 0.006 −0.009 0.005 −0.009 0.005 −0.009 0.005




−0.005 0.038 0.002 0.037 0.005 0.037 0.018 0.040
Collectivism–
individualism index
0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002



















0.213** 0.002 0.211** 0.002 0.210** 0.002 0.209** 0.001
Country level variance
Intercept variance 0.025** 0.007 0.024** 0.006 0.024** 0.006 0.024** 0.006
Slope variance
(Personal God)
0.003* 0.001 0.003* 0.001
Covariance −0.001 0.002 −0.001 0.002
Intercept variance −0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002
Slope variance
(Unsure)
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001





and evil (b =−0.059, p < .01) and those who are medium in expressive
individualism, i.e. those who believe that deviance is sometimes justified
(b =−0.030, p < .01) are less likely to prefer autonomy. Adding these
explanatory variables, decreases the coefficient for those who believe in
a Personal God with 11.7% compared to the first model (from b =
−0.128 to b =−0.113), whereas for those who are unsure about their
belief a decrease of 2.1% is noticed (from b =−0.048 to b =−0.047).
Additional analyses, again modelling both individual explanations separ-
ately show that adding only education decreases the coefficient of religious
individuals from -0.128 to -0.120, whereas no difference is noticed for
unsure individuals. In addition, including only expressive individualism,
the coefficient for religious individuals decreases (from b = -0.128 to b
= -0.121), whereas for unsure individuals the coefficient decreases only
slightly (from -0.048 to -0.047). This implies that education mediates
the relationship between being religious and preference for autonomy,
whereas this is not the case for those who are unsure. Moreover, expressive
individualism seems to account for differences in preferences in autonomy
for both religious and unsure individuals. However, the differences in
preferences for autonomy between religious and unsure individuals com-
pared to atheists remain significant at an alpha level of 0.01. Thus, edu-
cational level and expressive individualism partly explain the
relationship between atheistic beliefs and autonomy, conforming H2
and H3.
Model 3 includes random slopes for both dummies of the atheistic
beliefs. For those who believe in a personal God, the random slope (s2
=−0.003, p < .05) differs significantly per country. This means that the
relationship between atheistic beliefs and preferences for autonomy
varies across countries. Therefore, we add cross-level interactions in
Model 4. The interaction terms with secularisation are not significant
for both those who are religious and those who are unsure, indicating
that there is no weakening effect of living in a secular country on the
association between atheistic beliefs and preferences for autonomy, as pre-
dicted in H4. In addition, the cross-level interactions for collectivism-indi-
vidualism is not significant either. This implies that living in a collectivistic
culture does not weaken the relationship between atheistic beliefs and pre-
ferences for autonomy, as stated in H5. These results are confirmed in
additional analyses, where both cross-level interactions are included sep-
arately. Moreover, variation in random slopes is still significant, indicating
that the cross-level interactions are not able to explain country variation in
preferences for autonomy.
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Conclusion and discussion
There is a vast body of research concerning the link between religion and
child-rearing values. However, not much theoretical progress has been
made concerning the child-rearing preferences of atheists. Often times,
differences in child-rearing preferences between atheists and religious
individuals are simply attributed to the fact that atheists are not religious.
Since atheists do not believe in religious aspects associated with obedience
such as Biblical literacy, this could be an explanation for their more nega-
tive attitude towards obedience. However, we argued that there might be
alternative explanations: educational level and expressive individualism.
Moreover, it was stated that next to individual factors, contextual
factors might influence the relationship between atheistic beliefs and
child-rearing preferences. After all, parents are likely to teach children
the values which they think are useful to be successful in the society
they live in (Tamis-LeMonda et al. 2008). Thus, obedience or autonomy
might be valued more in certain societies compared to others depending
on the country’s religious context and collectivistic-individualistic culture.
In line with our expectations, atheists were less likely to prefer obedi-
ence and more likely to prefer autonomy compared to religious individ-
uals and individuals who were unsure about their religious beliefs. Part
of this relationship could be explained by atheists having a higher edu-
cational level. Several theoretical explanations for the link between edu-
cational level and child-rearing values can be suggested. For example,
educational attainment would go together with the development of
more liberal views and higher cognitive reasoning. However, more
research is needed to determine which of the factors associated with a
higher educational level is most influential in the relationship between
atheistic beliefs and child-rearing values.
In addition, we showed that differences in expressive individualism could
explain differences in child-rearing preferences between atheists, religious
individuals and those who are unsure about their belief. Religious individ-
uals would be more likely to believe in a divine source that determines
whether your actions are right or wrong, whereas those who do not
believe in God would be more likely to determine for themselves what is
right and wrong, which is why they would prefer autonomy more. Interest-
ingly, for obedience only significant differences between the highest and the
lowest level of expressive individualism were observed, whereas for auton-
omy there were differences between all three levels of expressive individu-
alism. Thus, expressive individualism could explain differences in obedience
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between religious individuals and atheists, but not between those who were
unsure about their belief and atheists. On the other hand, expressive indi-
vidualism was able to explain differences in autonomy for both religious
individuals and those who were unsure compared to atheists.
Furthermore, it was argued that the country’s religious context would
moderate the relationship between atheistic beliefs and child-rearing
values. However, for obedience, we observed no significant random
slopes, which implies that the relationship between atheistic beliefs and
preferences for obedience is the same in all countries and thus no contex-
tual effect on this relationship exist. For autonomy on the other hand, the
relationship significantly varies across countries. However, no significant
moderating effect of religious context was found, indicating that living in a
secular country does not weaken the relationship between atheistic beliefs
and child-rearing preferences. Maybe the religious contextual effect is
dependent on whether atheists strongly identify with their atheistic
belief. For example, Zuckerman (2012) describes the difference between
losing faith in Scandinavia versus in the United States. Through in-
depth interviews, he discovered that this process was ‘not a big deal’ in
Scandinavia, whereas in the United States individuals described it as a per-
sonal struggle. Moreover, Scandinavian individuals who became atheist
are unconcerned about religion, whereas those in the United States tend
to oppose religion. Atheists are heavily stigmatised in the United States,
whereas this is not the case in Scandinavia. Following this reasoning, athe-
ists in the United States might be more inclined to oppose traditional reli-
gious views and thus show stronger preferences for autonomy compared
to their European counterparts since they seem to more consciously
choose their atheistic lifestyle (Zuckerman 2012). Unfortunately, no infor-
mation about atheistic identification is available in EVS (2011). Further
research is needed to look into this topic.
In addition, the United States is an interesting case as it is a highly indi-
vidualistic country. The results of our study showed that living in a collec-
tivistic or individualistic culture does not seem to influence the
preferences for autonomy of either of the compared groups. Maybe this
is due to the relatively small variation in country scores on the collecti-
vism-individualism index in Europe. It would be interesting to expand
the study with countries across the world, and find out whether living
in a truly individualistic (or truly collectivistic) culture influences the
relationship between atheistic beliefs and preferences for autonomy.
In conclusion, this study has shed light on factors that explain the
relationship between atheistic beliefs and child-rearing values. However,
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further research is needed to gain more insight into the individual and
contextual factors that influence child-rearing preferences of atheists. In
order to find out more about the motives atheists (and individuals with
other religious and non-religious beliefs) have for preferring certain
child-rearing values, a qualitative approach would be helpful as well, e.g.
to establish to what extent and why individuals identify with atheism
and how this influences their child-rearing values. Moreover, in some
countries, atheists are a very small minority. For example, in Malta, one
of the most religious countries in Europe, the EVS sample includes only
1% of atheists. A qualitative approach might do more justice to the influ-
ences of religious context on child-rearing values of atheists in very reli-
gious countries because it is possible to focus on these minority groups.
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